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ARTICLE
DIAGNOSTICS NEED NOT APPLY
REBECCA S. EISENBERG*

Diagnostic testing helps caregivers and patients understand a patient's
condition,

predict

future

outcomes,

select

appropriate

treatments,

and

determine whether treatment is working. Improvements in diagnostic testing
are essential to bringing about the long-heralded promise of personalized
medicine.1 Yet it seems increasingly clear that most important advances in this
type of medical technology lie outside the boundaries of patent-eligible subject
matter. 2 The clarity of this conclusion has been obscured by ambiguity in the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning patent eligibility. Since its

20 1 0 decision in Bilski

v.

Kappos, 3 the Court has followed a discipline of

limiting judicial exclusions from the statutory categories of patentable subject
matter to a finite list repeatedly articulated in the Court's own prior decisions

* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law· School. I
gratefully acknowledge the support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University
of M ichigan. This article benefited from helpful comments of workshop participants at the
University of Michigan Law School and Boston University Law School.
1
See, e.g. , Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet: President Obama 's Precision
Medicine Initiative,
THE WH ITE HOUSE
(Jan.
30,
20 1 5),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 1 5/0 I /30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s
precision-medicine-initiative (archived at http://perma.cc/5HJN-3KMU); see generally U.S.
Fooo & DRUG ADMIN., Paving the Way for Personalized Medicine: FDA 's Role in a New
Era
of
Medical
Product
Development
(20 I 3),
available
at
http://www. fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PersonalizedMedicine/UC
M 3 7242 I .pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/34F9-3AFX).
2 See, e.g. , Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 289 (20 1 2);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d. 1 37 1 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 5); In re BRCA I - &
BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d. 755 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 4);
U.S.P.T.O., 20 1 4 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 746 1 8
(Dec. 1 6, 201 4); U.S.P.T.O., July 20 1 5 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at
http://www. uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/20 1 4-interim
guidance-subject-matter-el igibil ity-O (last visited Sept. 1 1 , 2 0 1 5) (archived at
http://perma.cc/HEW6-79NE).
3 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (201 0).
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for "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,"4 while declining
to embrace other judicial exclusions that were never expressed in Supreme
Court opinions.5 The result has been a series of decisions that, while upending
a quarter century of lower court decisions6 and administrative practice, 7
purport to be a straightforward application of ordinary principles of stare
decisis. 8 As the implications of these decisions are worked out, the Court's
robust understanding of the exclusions for laws of nature and abstract ideas
seems to leave little room for patent protection for diagnostics.
This Article reviews recent decisions on patent-eligibility from the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit to demonstrate the obstacles to patenting
diagnostic methods under emerging law. Although the courts have used
different analytical approaches in recent cases, the bottom line is consistent:
diagnostic applications are not patent eligible. I then consider what the absence
of patents might mean for the future of innovation in diagnostic testing.

4 E.g. , Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75, 1 85 ( 1 98 1 ); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 ( 1 980). Other Supreme Court articulations of the traditional exclusions vary
somewhat, sometimes including "mental processes" and "abstract intellectual concepts."
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 ( 1 972); see also MacKay Radio & Tele. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 ( 1 939) (holding that "scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not [patentable]").
5 This is most clearly evident from the multiple opinions in the unanimous decision of
the Supreme Court in Bilski, 5 6 1 U.S. (upholding a rejection of a patent claim to a method
of hedging risks in commodities trading for lack of patentable subject matter). However,
although some lower court decisions had been understood to hold that "business methods"
were not patent-eligible, only four justices were ready to exclude "business methods" from
patentable subject matter in so many words. E.g. id. at 6 1 3 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
657 (Breyer, J., concurring). Yet the justices unanimously concluded that the particular
claims at issue were an impermissible effort to patent an "abstract idea." Id. at 609 (majority
opinion); id. at 6 1 9-20 (opinion of Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 658 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'!., 1 34 S. Ct. 2347 (20 1 4) (holding
computer-mediated method for mitigating settlement risk in a financial transaction through
the use ofa third-party intermediary unpatentable as an "abstract idea").
6 E.g. , Bilski, 5 6 1 U.S. at 6 1 2 ("The patent application here can be rejected under our
precedents on the un-patentability of abstract ideas. The Court, therefore, need not define
further what constitutes a patentable "process," beyond pointing to the definition of that
term provided in § I OO(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr. And
nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § I 0 I that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past.").
7 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1 333 (reviewing history of PTO
allowance of patent claims on isolated DNA molecules over 30-year period).
8 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07,
2 1 1 7- 1 9 (2013) (isolated DNA molecules not eligible for patent protection because they
"fell squarely within the law of nature exception," notwithstanding past practice of Patent &
Trademark Office of awarding gene patents). See also Bilski, 561 U.S.
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For three decades, beginning with the 1980 decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty and ending with the 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappas, the
Supreme Court did not hold any patents invalid for lack of patent-eligible
subject matter. Before that period, a line of Supreme Court decisions had held
that patent-eligible subject matter does not include laws of nature, natural
phenomena, abstract ideas, or mathematical algorithms.9 Although the Court
never repudiated these older cases, beginning in 1980 it seemed to take a more
generous approach to patent-eligible subject matter.10 These post-1980
decisions stressed the breadth of the statutory language defining patentable
subject matter 11 and quoted legislative history indicating that patentable
subject matter includes "anything under the sun that is made by man."12 In the
first decades following the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (the Federal Circuit),13 the old limits on patentable subject matter
seemed lost in antiquity. Biotechnology firms and universities obtained patents
on discoveries in the life sciences and asserted these patents against infringers
in the courts without serious challenge to their patent eligibility.14
During this period the Federal Circuit sometimes balked at the broad reach
of patent claims on discoveries of basic biological mechanisms and held them
invalid, but not for lack of patent-eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit
relied on other statutory provisions, including a robust interpretation of the
requirement that a patent claim must be supported by an adequate "written
description" of the invention,15 to prevent performers of basic research from
obtaining broad patents that would dominate future work of others. 16 The
·

9 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 ( 1 978); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 7 1 -72; Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 ( 1 948).
10 J . E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'!, Inc., 534 U.S. 1 24 (200 1 ) (upholding
patent-eligibility of com seed); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75 ( 1 98 1 ) (upholding patent
eligibility of method of curing synthetic. rubber using computer-implemented algorithm to
calculate cure time); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 ( 1 980) (upholding patent
eligibility of genetically-engineered microorganism).
1 1 35 U.S.C. § I O I (20 1 2) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.").
12
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1 979, at 5 ( 1 952); H.R. Rep.
No. 82- 1 923, at 6 ( 1 952)).
1 3 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1 982, Pub. L. No. 97- 1 64, 96 Stat. 25 ( 1 982).
1 4 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable
Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After I n re Bilski, 3 J . L. TECH. & INTERNET I , 9- 1 0
(20 1 1 ).
1 5 35 U.S.C. § 1 1 2 (20 1 2); see, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1 336
(Fed. Cir. 20 I O); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 9 1 6 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1 1 9 F.3d 1 559 (Fed. Cir. 1 997).
1 6 Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1 353 ("Such claims merely recite a description of the
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Federal Circuit justified this approach as reflecting a policy of confining the
patent system to "useful arts" rather than basic research:
Ariad complains that the [written description] doctrine
disadvantages universities to the extent that basic research
cannot be patented. But the patent law has always been
directed to the 'useful Arts,' U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
meaning inventions with a practical use. . . . Patents are not
awarded for academic theories, no matter how
groundbreaking or necessary to the later patentable inventions
of others. '[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful
conclusion.' Requiring a written description of the invention
limits patent protection to those who actually perform the
difficult work of 'invention' -that is, conceive of the
complete and final invention with all its claimed
limitations-and disclose the fruits of that effort to the
public.17
Meanwhile the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), facing a deluge of
patent applications on newly identified DNA sequences of unknown function,
limited patents on these early stage discoveries through more robust
enforcement of the requirement that a patent application must disclose a
specific and substantial utility for an invention.18 The Federal Circuit approved
of this approach in affirming rejection of claims to gene fragments of unknown
function:
The claimed [DNA molecules] are not an end of Fisher's
research effort, but only tools to be used along the way in the
search for a practical utility. Thus, while [they] may add a
noteworthy contribution to biotechnology research, . . . we
hold that the claimed [molecules] have not been researched
and understood to the point of providing an immediate, well
defined, real world benefit to the public meriting the grant of
a patent.1 9
These Federal Circuit decisions articulate concerns similar to those
expressed by the Supreme Court in patentable subject matter cases about the
importance of preventing premature patents on basic research discoveries, as
distinguished from practical applications. But rather than holding these
discoveries to be outside the scope of patentable subject matter, the Federal
Circuit and the PTO used other levers in the patent system to limit the

problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and . . . leaving it to the
pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished invention.").
17 Id. (internal citations omitted).
18
35 U.S.C. §§ I O I , 1 1 2; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U .S. 5 1 9 ( 1 966); U .S.P.T.O., Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1 092 (Jan. 5, 200 1 ).
19 In re Fisher, 42 1 F.3d 1 365, 1 376 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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availability of broad dominant patent claims on fundamental discoveries.
The Federal Circuit approach did not prevent the issuance of patents on a
new generation of diagnostic inventions. Diagnostic tests typically involve
measuring one or more variables in a patient (e.g., body temperature, white
blood cell count) and comparing those observations to reference values to
make an inference about the patient's condition, prognosis, or treatment
response. A wealth of new genomic information that became available in the
wake of the Human Genome Project provided an abundant source of new
biomarkers to use in diagnostic testing. Patent applicants might claim either the
markers themselves (e.g., newly identified genes or gene fragments or
mutations associated with disease) or a method of diagnosis that involves
observing markers in patients and comparing the patients' markers to standard
values or ranges (e.g., variants of a gene sequence that are or are not predictive
of disease) to make an inference about the patient's health or condition.
The usefulness of these tests for diagnostic purposes could provide "an
immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public" sufficient to satisfy
the utility requirement. 20 Yet even after identifying the disease relevance of a
gene or other marker, much more work may be necessary to identify additional
mutations associated with disease, to understand the disease pathway, and to
develop treatments. Research scientists feared that broad patents at this early
stage would interfere with this further research. Some empirical studies
suggested that in fact, patents rarely interfered with the work of academic
researchers, 21 perhaps because researchers simply ignored whatever patents
they might infringe.22 Nonetheless, some notable exceptions23 nurtured
outspoken opposition to gene patenting among influential organizations of
scientists and doctors. 24 Some of these organizations ultimately became

20 Id.
2 1 See, e.g. , Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human
Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1 09 1 (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the A nticommons in Biomedical
Research, 45 Haus. L. REv. I 059 (2008) (providing a summary and analysis of the
evidence); John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309
Science 2002 (2005).
22 Katherine J. Strandburg, Sharing Research Tools and Materials: Homo Scientificus
Innovator
Community
Norms
(2008)
available
at
and
User
http://dx.doi.org/ 1 0.21 39/ssrn. 1 1 36606 (archived at http://perma.cc/Q6YN-R2BK).
23 The most notable exception was patents on the BRCA 1 and BRCA2 breast cancer
genes controlled by M yriad Genetics. See E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad
Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 1 2(4) Genetics in Med. S39-S70 (April 20 1 0); see
also M ildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and license on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services 5 J . Molecular Diagnostics 3-8 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al.,
Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents A re Illustrated by the Case of
Haemochromatosis, 4 1 5 Nature 577, 579 (2002).
24 See generally U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Report of the Secretary' s
Advisory Committee o n Genetics, Health, and Society, Gene Patents and Licensing
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plaintiffs in a lawsuit challenging the validity of patent claims related to the
BRCAl and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer susceptibility. 25
THE ALARM BELL: LABORATORY CORPORATION V. METABOLITE LABORATORIES
While the litigation over BRCA gene patents was pending, three justices
gave an early signal that the broader universe of patents on diagnostic tests
could be vulnerable to challenge in a 2006 dissenting opinion from a decision
to dismiss certiorari in the case of Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite
Laboratories.26 The patent in that case included the following broad claim to a
diagnostic method:
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in
warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine; and
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said
body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. 27
The lower courts did not consider whether this claim raised a problem of
patentable subject matter,28 and a majority of the Court ultimately decided to
dismiss the case without reaching the merits.29 But three dissenting justices
were ready to invalidate the patent as violating the principle that one may not
patent "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."30 The
dissenters recognized that the category of natural phenomena is "not easy to
define,"31 but they were nonetheless so certain that "the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural
phenomenon"'32 that they saw no need to attempt a definition because the
claim "is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that
doctrine. "33

Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests (April 20 I 0) available at
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_patents_report_20 1 0.pdf (archived at
http://perma.cc/RT2Y-7TYT) [hereinafter SACGHS Final Report].
25 Original plaintiffs in this action included the Association for Molecular Pathology, the
American College of M edical Genetics, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, the
College of American Pathologists, in addition to individual research scientists. Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T. O., 669 F. Supp. 2d. 365, 370-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
26 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 1 24 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J. and Souter, J.).
27 Id. at 1 29
28 Id. at 1 32.
29 Id. at 1 25 (majority opinion).
30 Id. at 1 26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75, 1 85
( 1 98 1 )).
3 1 Id. at 1 34.
32 Id. at 1 35.
33 Id. ("[T]his case is not at the boundary. It does not require us to consider the precise
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Dissenting opinions are not law,34 but this dissent was a harbinger of a
significant shift in the Court's attitude towards patent eligibility. It is worth
pausing to consider just why the dissenters thought the recited correlation
between elevated levels of homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was a "natural
phenomenon" that called for the same treatment as E=rnc2, the law of gravity,
and the heat of the sun.35 The opinion identifies a clear rationale in prior cases
for the exclusion: that patents on "the basic tools of scientific and
technological work" might do more to impede than to promote scientific and
technological progress.36 Nonetheless, the opinion does not use that rationale
to clarify the distinction between natural phenomena and patent-eligible
inventions in the claim at issue.37
Perhaps they meant that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin
levels is an inherent regularity that exists apart from any human intervention.
In other words, if one could somehow observe the levels of homocysteine,
cobalamin, and folate in a set of people, one would see in individuals with
elevated homocysteine levels a corresponding deficiency in cobalamin and
folate; the correlation is therefore a natural phenomenon rather than a human
invention. But this framing ignores the (unnatural) technology of medical
diagnosis that is necessary to give meaning to the claim. The claim language
requires not only the observation of biomarker levels in a patient, but also the
characterization of certain levels as elevated or deficient. 38 Nature does not
scope of the 'natural phenomenon' doctrine or any other difficult issue. In my view, claim
1 3 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that doctrine. There can be
little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in
claim 1 3 is a ' natural phenomenon.'"). Id.
34 The Federal Circuit explicitly declined to consider the analysis set forth in the
laboratpry Corporation dissent and faulted the District Court for relying on that opinion in
its own decisions in Prometheus. See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 5 8 1
F.3d 1 336, 1 346 n . 3 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied
heavily on the opinion of three justices dissenting from the dismissal of the grant of
certiorari in laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite laboratories, Inc. . .
That dissent is not controlling law and also involved different claims from the ones at issue
here."); on remand, Prometheus labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. , 628 F.3d 1 347, 1 356
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 0) ("Again, with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not
controlling law, and it involved different claims from the ones at issue here.").
35 lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 1 26.
36 Id. at 1 26-27 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 ( 1 972)).
37 Id. at 1 34 ("Nor can one easily use such abstract categories directly to distinguish
instances of likely beneficial, from likely harmful, forms of protection.").
38 One might object that the claim language does not specify what counts as an elevated
level of homocysteine or a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. If these levels are not defined
elsewhere in the patent specification, that imprecision might make the claim invalid for
indefiniteness. 35 U.S.C. § 1 1 2 (20 1 2). The Supreme Court has fortified this statutory
requirement in a more recent case. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U .S. 1 24,
1 3 7 (20 1 4). Ruling years before the Nautilus decision, the Federal Circuit considered and
rejected a challenge to the validity of Claim 1 3 on this basis. Metabolite Labs., Inc., v. Lab.
.
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specify when homocysteine levels are elevated and when vitamin levels are
deficient. These diagnostic conclusions reflect human judgments about the
difference between sickness and health that are not inherent in nature. They are
human constructs that belong to the applied technology of medical diagnosis.
In Justice Breyer's paraphrase, "the process is no more than an instruction to
read some numbers in light of medical knowledge."39 But the "medical
knowledge" embedded in the claim is a technological filter that identifies
which numbers to consider, and specifies when those numbers call for medical
attention.
Near the end of the dissent, Justice Breyer candidly reveals a concern that
patent claims might impinge on the practice of medicine, as distinguished from
future research. 40 Although the principle justification he cites for the exclusion
of "natural phenomena" from patent eligibility looks to the interests of
researchers,41 Justice Breyer's justification for reaching the merits without the
benefit of prior consideration of the issue in the lower courts focuses on the
interests of doctors and patients:
[S]pecial public interest considerations reinforce my view
that we should decide this case. To fail to do so threatens to
leave the medical profession subject to the restrictions
imposed by this individual patent and others of its kind.
Those restrictions may inhibit doctors from using their best
medical judgment; they may force doctors to spend
unnecessary time and energy to enter into license agreements;
they may divert resources from the medical task of health
care to the legal task of searching patent files for similar
simple correlations; they may raise the cost of healthcare
while inhibiting its effective delivery. 42
Perhaps these "special considerations" motivated the dissenters not only to
reach the merits, but also to interpret the traditional exclusion for natural
phenomena broadly in order to limit patents on medical technologies. Patents
undoubtedly increase costs and restrict utilization of patented inventions, in
medicine as in other fields. 43 But so far neither the courts nor Congress have
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1 354, 1 363-5 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
39 lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 1 37 .
40 Id. a t 1 38.
41 Id. at 1 26-27 ("The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws
of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. . . . The
problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing
monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by
impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the
use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming
searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and
by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so. ").
42 Id. at 1 38 .
43 See id. at 1 27 ("[Patents] can discourage research by impeding the free exchange o f

264

B. U

J. SCI. & TECH L.

[Vol. 21.2

embraced a categorical exclusion of medical technologies from patent
eligibility. Instead, Congress enacted a statutory exclusion of certain remedies
for patent infringement against medical practitioners and related health care
entities. 44 Indeed, the dissenters cited this legislation as a reason to decide the
case so as to "help Congress determine whether legislation is needed."45
Perhaps the Laboratory Corporation dissenters intended to sound an alarm bell
for Congress to take notice of diagnostic method patents and to address their
implications for healthcare.46 But those policy considerations are quite distinct
from those that the dissenters identify in the older cases that support the
exclusion of natural laws and natural phenomena from patent eligibility in
order to leave "basic building blocks" free for use in future scientific and
technological work.
DIAGNOSTICS AS "NATURAL LAws," NOT "APPLICATIONS": MA YO

COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of patent-eligibility for diagnostic
methods six years later in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories.47 Justice Breyer's opinion for a unanimous court echoed the
approach of the Laboratory Corporation dissent, again asserting that the claim
at issue set forth "laws of nature" without defining that term. 48 The opinion

information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented
ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time consuming searches of existing or
pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of
using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.").
44 These l imitations were a last-minute addition to an appropriations bill and are codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (20 1 2) .
4 5 Lab. Corp. ofA m . Holding, 548 U.S. at 1 38. Just a few years later, the Court i n Bilski
v. Kappos drew a very different conclusion from a later Congressional enactment that
limited the enforcement of certain patents on business methods. American Inventors
Protection Act of 1 999, Pub. L. No. 1 06-1 1 3, 1 1 3 Stat. 1 50 1 A-552, 1 5 1 0A-555-6 ( 1 999),
codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (20 1 2). In an opinion not signed by any of the
Laboratory Corporation dissenters, the Bilski majority interpreted legislation providing a
novel defense against business method patents as an indication that Congress must consider
business methods to be within patentable subject matter. B ilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
606-07 (20 1 0).
46 In fact, as part of the America Invents Act of 201 1 Congress directed the PTO
Director to "conduct a study on effective ways to provide independent, confirming genetic
diagnostic test activity where gene patents and exclusive licensing for primary genetic
diagnostic tests exist" and to report the results of the study to Congress within nine months.
Leahy-Smith America I nvents Act, Pub. L. No. 1 1 2-29, § 27 1 25 Stat. 284, 338 (20 1 1 ). The
PTO held a public roundtable on diagnostic genetic testing in January 20 1 3 . U.S.P.T.O.,
Notice of Public Roundtable on Diagnostic Genetic Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 7 1 1 70 (Nov. 29,
2 0 1 2). The PTO has not delivered its report as of this writing.
47 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 289 (20 1 2).
48 Id. at 1 30 I .
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followed a two-step approach to patent eligibility.49 The first step is to identify
any excluded subject matter (such as natural laws or abstract ideas) in the
patent claim. 50 The second step is to decide whether the claim adds enough
beyond the excluded subject matter to be sure that it properly counts as a
patent-eligible application of the excluded subject matter, rather than an
impermissible claim to the excluded subject matter itself. 51
The Court took a very expansive approach to the identification of natural
phenomena in the first step of the analysis in Mayo. The claim at issue recited
a method of optimizing the dosage of thiopurine drugs by monitoring drug
metabolite levels to make sure they remained within a specified range:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a
subject
immune-mediated
having
said
gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said
having
subject
immune-mediated
said
gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol
per 8xl08 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400
pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease
the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject.52
Like the claim at issue in Laboratory Corporation, this claim recites
correlations between observed biomarker levels and diagnostic inferences. 53
Yet a broader implicit definition of "laws of nature" is necessary to understand
the Court's application of that label to the Mayo claim than was necessary to
make sense of its application to the Laboratory Corporation claim. For one
thing, the biomarkers that are observed in the Mayo claim are formed because
of a medical intervention that does not occur in nature.54 Elevated

49 Although the exclusion that the Court considered in Prometheus was "natural laws,"
the Court drew its approach in significant part from prior decisions about the exclusion of
"mathematical algorithms," especially Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) and Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and later used a similar analysis to determine whether a
business method claim was an impermissible patent on an "abstract idea" in Alice
Corporation v. CLS Bank, Int'[., 134 S. Ct. 1347 (2014).
50 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
51 Id. at 1297-98.
52 Id. at 1295.
53 Id. at 1295-96.
54 Id. at 1297.
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homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiencies may well arise in the natural
world without any human intervention (although, as noted above,55 these
diagnostic characterizations represent human technological judgments rather
than mere observations of nature). But nature does not administer thiopurine
drugs to patients with immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders, nor does
nature monitor the effects to determine the proper dosage for a particular
patient. The claimed process to "a method of optimizing treatment" does not
merely observe nature, but explicitly guides doctors on how to adjust the
course of treatment in order to keep the effects of treatment within specified
limits. These limits are not set by nature, but reflect human judgments about
how to trade off the misery of immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders
against the misery of drug side effects. This technological choice reflects
human characterizations and preferences that are not inherent in nature.
Plainly, Justice Breyer's understanding of what counts as laws of nature is
not limited to phenomena that occur without human intervention:
Prometheus' patents set forth laws of nature - namely,
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in
the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine
drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. . . . While it take a
human action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to
trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person,
the relation itself exists in principle apart from any human
action. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body - entirely
natural processes. 56
This suggests a very broad definition of "laws of nature" that includes any
prediction of the effects of medical treatment in a patient, because the Court
evidently sees the body's responses to treatment as "entirely natural
processes." It makes no difference that the response was set in motion by
medical intervention.
But identifying a law of nature is only the first step in the analysis. Justice
Breyer recognizes that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas."57 He finds
in the prior cases a limiting principle that prevents the exclusions from
eviscerating patent law: although laws of nature, natural phenomena and
abstract ideas themselves are un-patentable "as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work,"58 useful applications of these tools may be
patent-eligible. A claim to a process that uses a natural law must "also contain
other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to

55 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
56 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 296-97.
57 Id. at 1 293.
5 8 Id. at 1 293 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 ( 1 972)).
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significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."59 To count as a
patent-eligible application, the claim "must do more than simply state the law
of nature while adding the words 'apply it. "'60
If all inventions make use of natural phenomena, laws of nature, and
abstract ideas, it might seem that the real work of distinguishing patentable
applications from un-patentable "laws of nature" must occur at step two of the
analysis. But a close reading of the Mayo opinion suggests the opposite: one
must understand the scope of the exclusions at step one in order to figure out
what is left in the claims that might be sufficient to confer patent eligibility. In
the case of diagnostic methods, the Court's broad understanding of what
belongs in the category of "natural laws" prevents the Court from recognizing
diagnosis as a form of applied technology at all.
The Court concludes that the other elements of the Mayo claim do not "add
enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws"
because the steps of administering thiopurine drugs to a patient and measuring
metabolite levels in tissue samples were "well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field." Some
commentators have criticized this analysis as improperly conflating the
requirements of patentable subject matter on one hand and the requirements of
novelty and nonobviousness on the other hand,61 and some lower court
decision have read the decision as limiting patent eligibility to "inventive
applications" of natural laws, 62 although the PTO reads the decision more
narrowly. 63 Understanding the opinion as requiring an "inventive application"

59
60

Id. at 1 294.
Id.

61

Jeff Lefstin traces this conflation to the opinion of Justice Douglas in Funk v. Kala,
333 U.S. 1 27 ( 1 948). Jeffrey A Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV.
565, 623-3 1 (20 1 5).
62
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom. 788 F.3d 1 37 1 , 1 377 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 5) ("Because the
method steps were well-understood, conventional and routine, the method of detecting
paternally inherited cftDNA is not new and useful. The only subject matter new and useful
as of the date of the application was the discovery of the presence of cftDNA in maternal
plasma or serum."); id. at 1 379 (agreeing that the invention "combined and utilized man
made tools of biotechnology in a new way that revolutionized prenatal care," but noting
"that the Supreme Court instructs that "groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 1 0 1 inquiry" (citing Myriad Genetics, 1 33 S. Ct. at
2 1 1 7)). But cf Genetic Technologies, Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d
922, 929 (N.D. Cal. 201 4) (noting in response to argument that non-excluded claim
elements consisted of "known prior art techniques" that "Agilent's arguments conflate the
analysis of patent eligible subject matter under § I 0 I with analysis of novelty and non
obviousness under §§ I 02 and 1 03 ).
63
U.S.P.T.O., 20 1 4 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg.
746 1 8, 74624 (Dec. 1 6, 20 1 4) ("A claim directed to a judicial exception must be analyzed to
determine whether the elements of the claim, considered both individually and as an ordered
"
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of the natural laws suggests that perhaps a more innovative diagnostic method
could prove patent-eligible in a future case.
But the Court stops short of resting its determination of patent ineligibility
on the fact that other claim steps were too conventional:
We need not, and do not, now decide whether were the steps
at issue here less conventional, these features of the claims
would prove sufficient to invalidate. For here, as we have
said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural laws
themselves. 64
This is the essential problem for diagnostic method claims under the Court's
analysis: because the Court codes the heart of the diagnostic method - the
determination of when it is appropriate to modify treatment for a particular
patient - as belonging to the realm of natural laws, it does not recognize any
application of those laws (whether "inventive" or "conventional") in the claim
at all. 65 Despite the very specific criteria set forth in the final "wherein"
clauses in the claim for determining when it is appropriate to adjust the drug
dosage, the Court sees that language as reciting an excluded natural law rather
than an application.66 The Court thus concludes that the claim merely recites
natural laws followed by a general instruction to "apply it" in some unspecified
way:
[T]he 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the
relevant natural laws, at most adding a suggestion that he
should take those laws into account when treating his
patient . . . (rather like Einstein telling linear accelerator
operators about his basic law and then trusting them to use it
where relevant). 67
The Einstein analogy seems fundamentally confused. The insight that e=mc2
provides only the most basic starting point for "linear accelerator operators"
who would need considerably more help to translate this insight into practical
applications; indeed, the obvious magnitude of the remaining work and the
varie1{' of applications that subsequent innovators might pursue is what makes
e=mc a compelling example of the distinction between "natural laws" and
.
applications of those laws.68 By contrast, the Mayo claim explains exactly how
to apply the recited correlations in the treatment of patients. 69 There is no

combination, are sufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more
than the exception itself . . . Individual elements viewed on their own may not appear to add
significantly more to the claim, but when combined may amount to significantly more than
the exception.").
64 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 302.
65 Id. at 1 29 1 .
66 Id. at 1 297.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1 295.
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distance whatsoever between the recited correlations and their practical
application. Yet because the Court sees the correlations themselves as natural
laws, it fails to recognize that the claimed invention - as is - is an entirely
practical and specific contribution to applied technology, ready for immediate
use.
Perhaps the Court does not recognize diagnosis alone (as distinguished from
treatment) as an application. Elsewhere the Court notes that the District
Court's interpretation of the claim does not include as an element the step of
actually adjusting the drug dosage, and that the claim would therefore be
infringed by making the diagnostic determination that the dosage should be
adjusted

even

without

following

through by

modifying

the

course

of

treatment. 70 Perhaps that is why the Court sees the claim as nothing more than
the recital of a law of nature followed by a general instruction to "apply the
law:"71 Perhaps it is only the therapeutic intervention that the Court would
recognize as a patent-eligible application of the law. Thus the Court states,
"[u]nlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an existing
drug, the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of
those [natural] laws. "72
The Court's lament that the claims "do not confine their reach" suggests a
belief that the claims before it are broader than "a typical patent on a new drug
or a new way of using an existing drug. "73 In fact, such a "typical patent " has a
broader, not narrower, reach than the

Mayo claim. The Mayo claim not only

specifies a drug limitation (thiopurine) and a use limitation (treatment of
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder), but adds the further limitations of
(I) measuring a particular biomarker and (2) using a particular algorithm to
determine the need to adjust the drug dosage. If the Court is worried about the
impact of the

Mayo claim on the search for future applications, it should worry

more, not less, about the impact of these "typical patents" on the same type of
research. The Mayo claim is a narrowing refinement of a particular application
rather than a new scientific discovery that has not yet been reduced to a
particular application.
Elsewhere the Court seems to recognize the narrow scope of the claim, but
insists that this does not save it from invalidity because it follows from the
narrow scope of the underlying "natural law":
The underlying functional concern here is a
much

future

innovation

contribution of the inventor.

is
.

foreclosed
.

relative one: how
relative

to

the

. A patent upon a narrow law

70 Id. at 1 296. Professor Holman explains the divided infringement problem for claims
to diagnostic methods in Christopher M. Holman, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: How Limelight Compounds the Challenges Facing Biotechnology Innovators After
Mayo and Myriad, 33 BtOTECH. L. REP. 1 35-38 (20 1 4). See infra note 84.
7 1 See supra note 6 1 and accompanying text.
72 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 302.
13 Id.
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of nature may not inhibit future research as seriously as
would a patent upon Einstein's law of relativity, but the
creative value of the discovery is also considerably smaller.
And, as we have previously pointed out, even a narrow law of
nature (such as the one

before

us) can inhibit

future

research. 74
Of course, any patent can inhibit research. But the intuitive appeal of
keeping basic building blocks such as natural laws outside the patent system is
that, because they are so basic, patents on natural laws could inhibit research
into many different applications. Thus the Court suggests that the danger posed
by patents on "new laws of nature .. . becomes acute when a patented process
amounts to no more than an instruction to 'apply the natural law,' or otherwise
forecloses

more

future

invention

than

the

underlying

discovery

could

reasonably justify. "75 If the underlying concern is that a nonspecific directive
to "apply the natural law " could foreclose a broader range of future innovation
than the underlying discovery justifies, then the specificity of the application
recited in the claim would seem to address that concern directly. But because
the Court sees the diagnostic inference recited in the claim as a natural law, it
fails to recognize that the claim recites a very specific diagnostic application.
Perhaps the Court would have recognized the claimed invention as an
application if it had included the steps of raising or lowering the drug dosage
as actual claim elements (rather than merely reciting when such an adjustment
is indicated in the "wherein " clauses at the end of the claim). Such a claim
would look more like "a typical patent on . . . a new way of using an existing
drug. "76 But diagnosis and treatment are distinct aspects of healthcare and may
be performed by different

actors.

As diagnostic testing becomes more

sophisticated, this functional separation between diagnosis and treatment is
likely to become more common.
If diagnostic patent claims must include treatment steps, both the healthcare
provider that performs only the treatment steps and the laboratory that
performs only the diagnostic steps may avoid infringement liability. 77 A new
diagnostic that guides the choice of treatment is itself a valuable contribution
to healthcare that may be worthy of a patent even if the resulting treatment is
entirely conventional. The conceptual separation between diagnosis and
treatment is not the same as the distinction between natural laws and specific
applications of those laws. Diagnosis is itself an application.

74 Id. at 1 303.
75 Id. at 1 30 1 .
76 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77 When different actors perform different steps of a patented method they may each
avoid infringement liability. It is easy to avoid infringement liability for a patented method
performed by different actors none of which controls the other's behavior. See Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 1 34 S. Ct. 2 1 1 1 (2014).
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SEARCHING FOR ANOTHER RATIONALE

Mental Steps and Abstract Ideas
The distinction between diagnostic and treatment steps roughly corresponds
to a distinction between observation and analysis on one hand and tangible
medical intervention on the other hand. The Court mentions repeatedly that the

Mayo claim does not include treatment steps and could therefore be infringed
by mere thoughts, 7 8 although it does not rest its holding of patent-ineligibility
on that basis. But perhaps the fact that the core diagnostic inference takes the
form of analysis of information rather than tangible physical steps plays a
larger role in the Court's judgment than it plays in its opinion. 79
Some subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have followed the lead of the
Supreme Court to invalidate diagnostic method claims, but have not relied on
the exclusion of laws of nature to reach that result. Instead, they have relied
upon the exclusion for "abstract ideas."
The first post

Mayo decision of the Federal Circuit on the patent-eligibility
80 a
v. USPTO,

-

of diagnostic methods was Association for Molecular Pathology

case better known for its challenge to product claims associated with the
BRCAl and BRCA2 genes. A previous Federal Circuit decision in that case81
was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of the

Mayo decision, and

was vacated and remanded to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of

78 See, e.g., Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 296 ("The District Court also accepted Prometheus'
view that a doctor using Mayo's test could violate the patent even ifhe did not actually alter
his treatment decision in the light of the test. In doing so, the court construed the claim 's
language, 'indicates a need to decrease' (or 'to increase'), as not limited to instances i n
which the doctor actually decreases (or increases) the dosage level where the test results
suggest that such an adjustment is advisable. "); id. at 1 302 (" . . . the patent claims . . . tell a
treating doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the resulting measurements i n
light o f the statistical relationships they describe. In doing so, they tie up the doctor' s
subsequent treatment decision whether that treatment does, o r does not, change in light of
the inference he has drawn using the correlations.").
79 Professor Kevin Collins argues that although on its "rhetorical surface" the
Prometheus opinion is about natural laws, it might be better analyzed in terms of other
exclusions from patentable subject matter for "mental steps" and "printed matter." Kevin E.
Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 Hous. L. REV. 391
(201 3). See also Kevin E. Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1 279 (20 1 4).
80 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1 303 (Fed. Cir.
201 2), ajJ'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3).
81 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. P.T.O., 653 F.3d 1 329 (Fed. Cir. 201 1 ) cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics,
Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 794 (20 1 2) and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom. Ass'n. for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P. T. O., 467 F. App 'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 201 2).
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Mayo.82 The Supreme Court later reviewed the decision on the product claims
only, 83 leaving the Federal Circuit's analysis of the method claims as the final
word on the patent-eligibility of those claims. Although the Federal Circuit
panel was divided on the proper analysis of the product claims to DNA
sequences, 84 there was no disagreement about the method claims.85
Most of the method claims covered methods of comparing a patient's
BRCAI or BRCA2 sequence to the normal sequence to detect mutations
associated with predisposition to develop cancer. 86 The panel agreed that these
method claims were ineligible for patent protection. It would have been a
simple matter to explain this result as a straightforward application of the
Supreme Court's decision in

Prometheus

v.

Mayo, given the similarities

between the two cases. Yet the court explicitly based its decision instead on the
reasoning in its own previous opinion87 - the one vacated by the Supreme
Court - that the claims were improperly drawn to "abstract mental processes ":
This court in its now-vacated decision of July

29, 20 1 1 , had

held [the method claims]-all of which consist of analyzing
and comparing certain DNA sequences-not to be patent
eligible subject matter on the ground that they claim only
abstract mental processes. In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in

Mayo, we reaffirm that prior holding. The Court

82 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d. at 1 303.
83 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3).
84 Each member of the three-judge panel wrote separately. Ass 'n for Molecular
Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1 308, 1 325-33 (Lourie, J . ) (holding that all of the product claims are
patent-eligible because neither isolated BRCA l and BRCA2 DNA molecules nor BRCAl
and B RCA2 cDNA molecules occurs in nature) ; id at 1 337, 1 340-47 (Moore, J., concurring
in part) (concurring in the judgment on the ground that longstanding PTO practice of
allowing such claims should not be set aside without Congressional action); id. at 1 348
(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in the judgment with
respect to cDNA claims but not claims to isolated DNA that is not materially different from
native DNA).
85 Id. at 1 337 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (joining the majority with respect to the
method claims at issue); id. at 1 348 (Bryson, J . , concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concurring with the portions of the court's judgment that are directed to the patentability of
the method claims).
86 Id. at 1 309- 1 0 (majority opinion) (For example, a representative claim recited: "A
method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCAI gene, said alteration selected from
the group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 1 2A, 1 4, 1 8 or 1 9 in a human
which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA 1 gene or BRCA I RNA from a human
sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA l cDNA made from mRNA from said human
sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion of 4 nucleotides
corresponding to base numbers 4 1 84-87 of SEQ ID NO: ! ") (citing U.S. Patent No.
5,7 1 0,00 1).
87 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 653 F.3d 1 329, 1 333 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 1 )
affd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3) (referring to its reasoning in 653 F.3d 1 329 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 1 )).
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essentially claim natural laws that are not eligible for patent.
Without expressly analyzing the instant method claims in the
context of the Court's reasoning, but in light of the Court's
holding, and in view of our own prior reasoning, set forth
herein below, those method claims cannot stand.88
Although it may seem insubordinate to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning
even when it does not change the result, the Federal Circuit has continued to
use the exclusions for "mental steps " and "abstract ideas" as the basis for
invalidating diagnostic method claims, sometimes in decisions issued as
"unpublished or nonprecedential. " For example, in

PerkinElmer v. Intema,89
Mayo and its

the Federal Circuit cited both the Supreme Court 's decision in
own decision in

Myriad Genetics to invalidate claims to a noninvasive prenatal

screening method to detect increased risk of having a fetus with Down
syndrome. 90 The Court observed that the claims "recite mental processes and
natural laws " and that "as in

Mayo, there is no requirement that a doctor act on

the calculated risk."91 In its "unpublished or nonprecedential " decision in

Smartgene v. Advanced Biological Laboratories,92 the Federal Circuit relied on
its own prior decisions excluding "mental steps " from patent eligibility to
invalidate a very broad claim to a computer-implemented "method for guiding
the selection of a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known
disease or medical condition." While taking note of the Supreme Court's
decision in

Mayo, the court did not characterize the claims before it as reciting
natural laws.93

88 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1 303, 1 333 (Fed.
Cir. 20 1 2).
89 Perkin Elmer, Inc. v. Intema, Ltd., 496 Fed. Appx. 65, 72 (Fed. Cir. 201 2).
90 Id. at 66-67 (Representative Claim I reads as follows: "A method of determining
whether a pregnant woman is at an increased risk of having a fetus with Down's syndrome,
the method comprising the steps of: measuring the level of at least one screening marker
from a first trimester of pregnancy by: (i) assaying a sample . . . ; and/or (ii) measuring at
least one first ultrasound screening marker from an ultrasound scan . . . ; measuring the level
of at least one second screening marker from a second trimester of pregnancy, the at least
one second screening marker from the second trimester of pregnancy being different from
the at least one first screening marker from the first trimester of pregnancy, by: (i) assaying
a sample . . . ; and/or (ii) measuring at least one second ultrasound screening marker from an
ultrasound scan . . . ; and determining the risk of Down's syndrome by comparing the
measured levels of both the at least one first screening marker from the first trimester of
pregnancy and the at least one second screening marker from the second trimester of
pregnancy with observed relative frequency distributions of marker levels in Down 's
syndrome pregnancies and in unaffected pregnancies").
91 Id. at 70-7 1 .
92 SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., 555 Fed. Appx. 950, 95 1 -53 (Fed. Cir.
20 1 4).
93 Id. at 955 ("The Supreme Court in Mayo, though addressing a case involving the ' law
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More recently the Federal Circuit used the exclusion for "abstract ideas " to
invalidate another set of diagnostic method claims related to the BRCAl and
BRCA2 breast cancer genes that had not been at issue in the earlier

Myriad
re BRCAJ- and BRCA 2-Based Hereditary Cancer
Test Patent Litigation. 94 The defendant argued that the Mayo case was directly

litigation in its decision in In

on point, but the court avoided agreeing with that characterization: "We need
not decide if Mayo is directly on point here because the method claims before
us suffer from a separate infirmity: they recite abstract ideas. "95 The court
relied on its own prior decision in
"comparing "

and

"analyzing "

Myriad to conclude that the claim steps of

DNA

sequences

recited

patent-ineligible

"abstract ideas, "96 then turned to the Supreme Court's more recent analysis in

A lice Corporation

v.

CLS Bank97 to conclude that other claim elements did not

add enough to the patent-ineligible abstract ideas to make the claim as a whole
patent-eligible. 98
If both natural laws and abstract ideas are patent-ineligible, and if the
scrutiny of additional claim elements in the second step of the analysis is the
same either way, in many cases it may not matter which of the traditional
exclusions the court relies upon. Although none of these terms has been clearly
defined, there is likely some redundancy in the list of exclusions.
But the exclusions may not be identical, and the choice of exclusion might
therefore sometimes change the outcome. For example, consider the following
claim to a method of screening cancer therapeutics, which the Federal Circuit
held patent-eligible in its

Myriad decision on remand from the Supreme

of nature' exclusion from section 1 0 I , recognized that 'mental processes' and 'abstract
ideas' (whatever may be the precise definition and relation of those concepts) are excluded
from section I O I . . . . Whatever the boundaries of the 'abstract ideas' category, the claim at
issue here involves a mental process excluded from section I 0 I : the mental steps of
comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify medical options.").
94 In re BRCAI -and-BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755,
764 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 4) (As set forth in the opinion, the patent claims "A method for screening
germline of a human subject for an alteration of a BRCA I gene which comprises comparing
germline sequence of a BRCA I gene or BRCAI RNA from a tissue sample from said
subject or a sequence of BRCA I cDNA made from mRNA from said sample with germline
sequences of wild-type BRCA I gene, wild-type BRCAI RNA or wild-type BRCA l cDNA,
wherein a difference in the sequence of the BRCA I gene, BRCAI RNA or BRCA I cDNA
of the subject from wild-type indicates an alteration in the BRCA I gene in said subject[,]
Wherein a germline nucleic acid sequence is compared by hybridizing a BRCA l gene probe
which specifically hybridizes to a BRCAI allele to genomic DNA isolated from said sample
and detecting the presence of a hybridization product wherein a presence of said product
indicates the presence of said allele in the subject"). Id. at 76 1 .

95 Id. at 762.
96 Id. at 763 .
97 A lice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank lnt'I., 1 34 S. Ct. 2347 (20 1 4).
98 In re BRCA l-and-BRCA2, 774 F.3d at 764. This second step of the analysis was quite
similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in Mayo.
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Court: 99
A method for screening potential cancer therapeutics which
comprises:

growing

a

transformed

eukaryotic

host

cell

containing an altered BRCAl gene causing cancer in the
presence

of a compound suspected

of being

a

cancer

therapeutic, growing said transformed eukaryotic host cell in
the absence of said compound, determining the rate of growth
of said host cell in the presence of said compound and the
rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said
compound and comparing the growth rate of said host cells,
wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell in the
presence

of said

compound

is

indicative

of a

cancer

therapeutic. 1 00
The court considered this claim patent-eligible, emphasizing its use of a
transformed host cell "derived by altering a cell to include a foreign gene,
resulting in a man-made, transformed cell with enhanced function and
utility. " 1 01 Since the claimed process was carried out in cells that are not
naturally occurring, "[t]he fact that the claim also includes the steps of
determining the cells' growth rates and comparing growth rates does not
change the fact that the claim is based on a man-made, non-naturally occurring
transformed cell-patent-eligible subject matter." 1 02

In other words, although the claim recited mental steps that were excluded
from patent-eligibility, because the claim also involved use of a man-made,
transformed host cell, the court saw it as a patent-eligible application.
This analysis is in some tension with

Mayo. There are notable similarities

between the BRCAl drug screening claim and the "method of optimizing
therapeutic efficacy " claim that the

Mayo Court held invalid (and in light of
Myriad). Both

which it asked the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in

claims involve use of a drug to trigger its effects - administering thiopurine to
a patient in Mayo, and exposing cells to a "compound suspected of being a
cancer therapeutic " in Myriad. Both involve measuring drug effects metabolite levels in

Mayo and growth rate of cells in Myriad

-

and comparing

resulting values to a standard - the metabolite levels set forth in the "wherein "
clauses in

Mayo and the observed growth rate of cells that have not been
Myriad. And both involve drawing certain

exposed to the compound in

inferences about the effects of the drug, recited in the "wherein" recitals at the
end of the claim. Presumably in both cases the reaction of the patient or cells to
the drug is "entirely natural " once you ignore the prior human intervention that
set the stage for observing these entirely natural processes. And in both claims
the process steps are entirely conventional apart from the excluded subject

99 See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
1 00
U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 1 56. 1 . 1 4-27 (filed May 5, 1 998).
1 01
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 689 F.3d 1 303, 1 336 (Fed. Cir. 201 2).
1 02
Id.
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matter.
Judge Lourie's opinion focused on the fact that the drug screening method
recited the use of a transformed host cell with an altered BRCA l gene that
does not occur in nature. But patients who have been treated with thiopurine
drugs also do not occur in nature. And if determining how to adjust the dosage
of a drug does not count as an application of the laws of nature that determine
drug effects, then surely the determination that a particular screened compound
exhibits drug effects

in a laboratory setting is even further removed from any

practical application.
The more important difference between the two cases is not the role of
nature, but rather the choice of which exclusion defined the starting points in
the analysis. Judge Lourie began by excluding mental steps rather than natural
laws, leaving the claim step of growing transformed host cells available for
consideration as an additional element that might save the patent-eligibility of
the claim overall. Framed this way, it was easy to conclude that the claim
"includes more than the abstract mental step of looking at two numbers and
"comparing" two host cells' growth rates." 103 Although the opinion, which was
primarily concerned with the patentability of natural products, characterized
the transformed host cells as "not naturally occurring," it seemed to matter
more to Judge Lourie that the claim included physically transformative process
steps in addition to mental steps:
[O]nce one has determined that a claimed composition of
matter is patent-eligible subject matter, applying various
known types of procedures to it is not merely applying
conventional steps to a law of nature. The transformed, man
made nature of the underlying subject matter in claim

20

makes the claim patent-eligible. The fact that the claim also
includes the steps of determining the cells' growth rates and
comparing growth rates does not change the fact that the
claim is based on a man-made, non-naturally occurring
transformed cell-patent-eligible subject matter.1 04
It is difficult to figure out exactly how the "man-made nature of the
underlying subject matter" relates to the exclusion of the mental steps of
"determining"

and

challengers in the

"comparing" in

this

passage. Perhaps

if the

patent

Myriad case had chosen to appeal the Federal Circuit's

decision on the drug screening method, the Court would have held that claim
be patent-ineligible, and would have admonished the Federal Circuit to follow
its teachings in

Mayo

v.

Prometheus concerning natural processes. But the

Court might instead have held that, although the Federal Circuit used the
wrong analytical approach, it correctly concluded that the drug screening
method was patent-eligible subject matter. The correct analysis under

Mayo

might have begun by excluding as "purely natural laws" the reactions of the

1 03
1 04

Id.
Id.
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host cells to the candidate drugs, and then considered whether the step of
growing the transformed host cells was sufficiently novel and unconventional
to make the claim overall patent-eligible.
Although the Supreme Court did not review the Federal Circuit's analysis of
the method claims in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
its review of the product claims paid no more attention than the Federal Circuit
had paid to the approach set forth in Justice Breyer's opinion in Mayo. 1 05 The
Court held that "isolated DNA" that (apart from its isolation) was otherwise
identical to naturally occurring DNA within chromosomes (gDNA) was a
product of nature and therefore patent-ineligible, but that "synthetically created
DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which . . . omits certain
portions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins" is patent
eligible "because it is not naturally occurring."10 6 The Myriad opinion cited
Mayo for the principle that the exclusion of "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" must not be interpreted so broadly as to
eviscerate patent law, 1 07 but it did not pursue the second step of the Mayo
analysis to search for an additional "inventive concept" in the claim to be sure
that it covered a patent-eligible application rather than the excluded matter
itself. The distinction between patent-eligible cDNA and patent-ineligible
gDNA instead appeared to rest entirely on the Court's understanding that
gDNA is naturally occurring,108 while cDNA is made in the laboratory.109 Had
the Court subjected the claims to the second step of the Mayo analysis, it might
have concluded that the process of creating cDNA from naturally occurring
messenger RNA is as routine and conventional as the process of creating
isolated genomic DNA.110 But because the Court was satisfied that cDNA is
synthetically created, it did not matter that the method of creating it was
routine and conventional.
Of course, the more important outcome of the Myriad litigation for the
patenting of diagnostics is not the patent-eligibility of some drug screening
methods, but rather the patent-ineligibility of naturally-occurring biomarkers
1 05

For an interesting critical analysis of the Myriad decision and its inattention to
Prometheus, see generally Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in
Myriad Genetics, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 505 (2014).
1 06
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v . Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07, 2 1 1 1
(20 1 3).
to7
Id. at 2 1 1 6.
tos
Id. at 2 1 1 7 ("Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and
useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.").
1 09
Id. at 21 1 9 ("cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patenting as naturally
occurring, isolated DNA segments. . . . the lab technician unquestionably creates something
new when cDNA is made.") For an excellent critique of this distinction, see generally
Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in Molecular
Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 1 5 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 639 (20 1 4).
i to
Id at 655-56.
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and methods of analyzing and comparing a patient 's biomarker to a recited
sequence. In broad terms,

Mayo invalidates patents on diagnostic methods,
Myriad invalidates patents on diagnostic markers. But the survival of the
drug screening method in Myriad left room, in theory, for the possibility that a
while

future diagnostic method might be patent-eligible if it makes use of human
made materials incorporating biomarkers.

Diagnostics vs. Therapeutics
The Supreme Court opinions in
similarity

Mayo and Myriad share an important

in consequence: each has

the effect of excluding diagnostic

applications from patent protection, while preserving the patent-eligibility of
therapeutic applications. The Court comes close to articulating this distinction
in

Mayo, when it compares the claim at issue to "a typical patent on a new drug

or a new way of using an existing drug" 1 1 1 and when it points to the fact that
infringement of the claim would not require that a doctor actually modify the
course of treatment. 1 12 The implication is that more typical patents on drugs
and methods of using drugs are patent-eligible applications,

in contrast to the

less typical patent at issue, which could be infringed by merely making a
diagnostic inference without "applying it" to change the course of treatment .
The distinction between diagnostics and therapeutics is less obvious in the

Myriad case, although the effect of excluding isolated gDNA from patent
protection while leaving c DNA and other recombinant DNA constructs patent
eligible

is to prevent the patenting

of many diagnostic markers while

preserving the availability of a form of patent claim that - at least in the past has been more valuable for developers of therapeutic products. Although the
Court did not explicitly say this, some amicus briefs explained it to the
Court. 1 1 3 For example, the first generation of biotechnology products were
therapeutic

proteins

(such

as

insulin,

human

growth

hormone

and

1 1 1 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
11 2 See supra note 78.
1 1 3 See, e.g., Brief for Eric S. Lander as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass'n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S . Ct. 2 1 07 (No. 1 2-398), 20 1 3 WL
263 1 062
at
*27,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs
v2/1 2-398_neither_amcu_lander.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.ccNF9V
PEA V) ("The vast majority of the medically and commercially important biotechnology
products developed over the past quarter century are protected by patents on . . non-natu ral
compositions of matter, such as cDNA and recombinant DNA molecules for such uses as
artificially producing therapeutic proteins. Only a small fraction of products involve
diagnostic claims to naturally occurring genomic DNA"). Cf Brief of the Coalition for 2 1 st
Century Medicine as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 3 3 S.
Ct.
2 1 07
(No.
1 2-398),
WL
263 1 062
at
* 1 2- 1 7,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs
v2/l 2-398_resp_amcu_c2 1 cm.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/AFV8WPHQ) (explaining the importance of gene patents to developers of diagnostic products).
.

-
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erythropoietin) produced in recombinant organisms that incorporated a cDNA
molecule as a template for protein production. For purposes of protein
production, what matters is the protein-encoding regions of a gene that are
retained in the cDNA molecule. Patents on the cDNA sequence (or on
recombinant constructs or host cells engineered to express the protein encoded
by the cDNA sequence) were enough to allow their owners to exclude
competitors from producing the therapeutic protein through recombinant DNA
technology, thereby making these products profitable. Patents on human-made
constructs incorporating a gene might also be valuable to a firm seeking to
develop gene therapy products. But for diagnostic purposes it is necessary to
compare the DNA in a patient's tissue sample to sequences that are predictive
of disease. It is thus important to use markers that correspond to portions of
naturally occurring variations of the sequence in order to create a valid test. If
the marker for disease susceptibility is not in a coding region of the gene, the
cDNA version will not do the job. 1 1 4
The United States as amicus curiae argued that cDNA should be patent
eligible, while gDNA should not, 1 1 5 a position that was ultimately persuasive
to the Supreme Court. Professor Christopher Holman has suggested that the
resonance of this distinction derives in part from the relatively compelling
economic case for allowing cDNA claims to provide effective patent
protection for therapeutic products.116
A similar de facto distinction appears in decisions of the Federal Circuit. For
example, in its pre-Mayo decision in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen, 1 17
1 1 4 See supra note 94, at 761 (noting if the relevant mutation is in a coding region,
cDNA may be a useful marker. Thus the broadly worded B RCA I diagnostic screening
method claims held patent-ineligible in In re BRCA I- and BRCA 2-Based Hereditary Cancer
Test Patent Litigation called in the alternative for the use in testing of "germline sequence of
a BRCAI gene or BRCAI RNA from a tissue sample from said subject or a sequence of
BRCAI cDNA made from mRNA from said sample with germline sequences of wild-type
BRCA I gene, wild-type BRCAI RNA or wild-type B RCAl cDNA").
11 5 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (No. 1 2-398), 201 3 WL
263 1 062
at
*7- 1 4,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs
v2/ I 2-398_neither_amcu_us.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/3ASB-J8DD).
11 6 Holman, supra note I 09, at 66 1 ("cDNA is widely used in drug discovery and drug
production, and one can suspect that the government used a distinction between cDNA and
genomic DNA as a proxy for a distinction between drugs and diagnostic testing, and the
Court acquiesced in this policy determination."); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the
Gene Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACAD. MED. 1 38 1 , 1 382-83 (2002) (discussing the
different roles played by DNA sequence patents in the development of therapeutics and
diagnostics).
11 7 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1 057, 1 060 (Fed. Cir.
201 1 ), cert. denied sub nom. GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, 1 33 S. Ct. 973
(20 1 3). The Federal Circuit's previous decision in Classen lmmunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court' s
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the Federal Circuit considered the patent-eligibility of several claims related to
the inventor's theory "that the schedule of infant immunization for infectious
diseases

can

affect

the

later

occurrence

of chronic

immune-mediated

disorders." 1 1 8 The court upheld the patent-eligibility of two claims that recited
a two-step "method of immunizing a mammalian subject" that involved, first,
reviewing data on the effects of different immunization schedules to determine
which schedule presents a lower risk of developing a chronic immune
mediated disorder, and second, immunizing a subject in accordance with the
lower-risk schedule. 1 1 9 At the same time, the court rejected as patent-ineligible
a claim to a "method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects
the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder" by using that
immunization schedule in a treatment group and comparing to results in a
control group. 120 The court explained the difference by noting that the patent
eligible

methods

included

"the

physical

step

of immunization

on

the

decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (20 1 0). Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen
I D EC, 1 30 S . Ct. 3541 (20 1 0).
1 1 8 Classen lmmunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d. at 1 060.
1 1 9 More specifically, the court set forth the following representative claim language: " I .
A method of immunizing a mammalian subject which comprises: (I) screening a plurality of
immunization schedules, by (a) identifying a first group of mammals and at least a second
group of mammals, said mammals being of the same species, the first group of mammals
having been immunized with one or more doses of one or more infectious disease-causing
organism-associated immunogens according to a first screened immunization schedule, and
the second group of mammals having been immunized with one or more doses of one or
more infectious disease-causing organism-associated immunogens according to a second
screened immunization schedule, each group of mammals having been immunized
according to a different immunization schedule, and (b) comparing the effectiveness of said
first and second screened immunization schedules in protecting against or inducing a
chronic immune-mediated disorder in said first and second groups, as a result of which one
of said screened immunization schedules may be identified as a lower risk screened
immunization schedule and the other of said screened schedules as a higher risk screened
immunization schedule with regard to the risk of developing said chronic immune mediated
disorder(s), (II) immunizing said subject according to a subject immunization schedule,
according to which at least one of said infectious disease-causing organism-associated
immunogens of said lower risk schedule is administered in accordance with said lower risk
screened immunization schedule, which administration is associated with a lower risk of
development of said chronic immune-mediated disorder(s) than when said immunogen was
administered according to said higher risk screened immunization schedule." Id. at 1 060-6 1 .
1 20 More specifically, the court set forth the claim language as follows: "A method of
determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic
immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with
one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule,
and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic i mmune
mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with
that in the control group." Id. at 1 06 1 .
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determined schedule. "1 2 1 Therefore, they were "directed t o a specific tangible
application," while the patent-ineligible method "claims the idea of comparing
known immunization results . . . but does not require using this information for
immunization purposes." 122 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Moore disagreed with
the majority's interpretation of the claim that it held patent-ineligible. Properly
interpreted, Judge Moore explained, that claim also recites an immunization
step as part of the method of determining the effects of the immunization
schedule. 123 Nonetheless, the majority interpreted the word "immunizing"
differently in the different patents: "[t]he 'immunizing' in the

' 283 patent [held

patent-ineligible]

data,

refers

to

the

gathering

of published

while

the

immunizing of the

' 1 39 and '739 patent claims [held patent-eligible] is the
physical implementation of the mental step claimed in the '283 patent. " 124

Whether or not this interpretation is plausible, the analysis reveals a clear view
that treatment is patent-eligible, but analysis of data is not.
The Federal Circuit cited

PerkinElmer

v.

Classen with approval in its post-Mayo decision,
Intema. 1 25 In that case, the court held patent-ineligible patent

claims to a method of determining whether a pregnant woman is at increased
risk of having a fetus with Down syndrome that did not include a "requirement
that a doctor act on the calculated risk. " 126 Again, mere diagnosis without
treatment steps was not patent-eligible.
None

of these decisions purports to rest on a policy decision that

therapeutics should be patentable and diagnostics should not. Quite the
contrary, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit insist that patent
policy decisions are the domain of Congress, and that they are merely applying
longstanding principles of patent law to the cases before them. 127 Yet a
distinction between therapeutics and diagnostics seems to lurk beneath the
surface of decisions that rest more explicitly on other distinctions. Whether the
courts talk about laws of nature versus applications of those laws, or natural

1 21 Id. at I 066.
1 22 Id. at 1 066-67.
1 23 Id. at 1 076-77 n. 1 . (Moore, J. dissenting).
1 24 Id. at 1 067.
1 25 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
1 26 PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App'x 65, 7 1 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 2).
1 27 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. , Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 289, 1 305
(20 1 2) ("[W]e must hesitate before departing from established general legal rules lest a new
protective rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in
another. And we must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules
where necessary . . . . We need not determine here whether, from a policy perspective,
increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable."); Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U .S.P.T.O., 689 F.3d at 1 303, 1 324 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 2) ("[P]atents on
life-saving material and processes, involving large amounts of risky investment, would seem
to be precisely the types of subject matter that should be subject to the incentives of
exclusive rights. But disapproving of patents on medical methods and novel biological
molecules are policy questions best left to Congress . . . . ).
"
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products versus man-made materials, or abstract ideas versus physically
transformative processes, or mental steps versus tangible applications, the
result is remarkably consistent: diagnostic applications do not count as patent
eligible subject matter.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Although the courts have not purported to decide on policy grounds to
exclude diagnostic applications from the patent system, they have made their
decisions against the backdrop of a lively debate about the impact of such
patents on innovation and patient access to testing. Much of this debate has
focused on patents related to genetic discoveries. 1 28 As the Human Genome
Project got underway in the 1990s, an increase in gene patents 1 29 caused
concerns about the impact of patents on biomedical research and on the
availability of genetic testing services. 13 0 Some empirical studies showed
fewer effects on research than had been feared, 1 3 1 but other studies showed
significant negative effects of patents on the development of diagnostic tests
and availability of testing services. 1 32
The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society
("SACGHS"),

1 28

chartered

in the fall of 2002 to provide advice and

See, e.g., SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24;

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,

REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMI C AND PROTEOMI C RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY

(2006) [ HEREINAFTER NRC STUDY] ; DAVID B.
A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING (2004); Caulfield,
et al., supra note 2 1 , at 1 09 1 -94; David Korn & Stephen J. Heinig, eds., Public versus
Private Ownership of Scientific Discovery: legal and Economic Analyses of the
Implications ofHuman Gene Patents, 77 ACAD. MED. 1 30 1 (2002).
1 29 NRC Study, supra note 1 28, at 1 0 1 -02.
1 3 0 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENETICS, GENOMICS, AND THE PATENTING OF DNA:
REVIEW OF POTENTIAL I M PLICATIONS FOR HEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005); U . K.
PUBLIC HEALTH GENETICS UNIT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GENETICS (2004);
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N., REPORT 99 - GENES AND INGENUITY: GENE PATENTING AND
HUMAN HEALTH (2004); DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, PATENTING HUMAN GENES AND STEM
CELLS (2004); ONT. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, GENETICS, TESTING AND GENE PATENTING:
CHARTING NEW TERRITORY IN HEALTHCARE (2002); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE
ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2002); 0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, & LICENSING PRACTICES:
EVIDENCE AND POLICIES (2002); NRC STUDY, SUPRA NOTE 1 28; SACGHS Final Report,
supra note 24; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 1 1 2-29, § 27 1 25
Stat. 284, 338 (20 1 1 ) (referring to Congressional directive to PTO to study "effective ways
to provide independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene patents and
exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist and to report back to
Congress).
1 3 1 See Eisenberg, supra note 2 1 (providing a summary of the evidence); see also
Caulfield et al., supra note 2 1 .
1 32 E.g., Cho et al., supra note 23; Merz et al., supra note 23.
RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME:
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recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on issues
raised by developments in human genetics, conducted a study of the role o f
gene patenting and licensing practices i n patient access to genetic tests a s one
of its first priorities. 133 The final report of the SACGHS study was published in

20 1 0, shortly before the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mayo and Myriad,
and was cited in many briefs submitted in those cases.134
The primary focus of the report was on access to clinical testing rather than
on incentives for research. Nonetheless, recognizing that access to testing
depends on adequate incentives to conduct basic genetic research and to
develop tests, the Committee also undertook to study the effects of gene
patents on R&D incentives. 135 Although acknowledging that "[s]trongly held
opposing

viewpoints .. .

[were]

expressed

throughout

the

Committee's

inquiry,'' 136 the Committee concluded that "patent-derived exclusive rights are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the development of genetic test
kits and laboratory-developed tests. " 137 The Committee also found "that the
patenting and licensing of genetic tests has limited the ability of clinical
laboratories to offer genetic testing " with detrimental effects on "patient
access, the quality of testing, and efforts to innovate. " l38

1 33 SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24, at ix-x.
1 34 See Brief for 2 1 st Century Medicine as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
2 1 , Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3) (No.
1 2-398); Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Academics in Law,
Medicine, Health Policy, and Clinical Genetics as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
3 , Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc. , 1 33 S . Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brieffor
American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Canavan
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 2, Ass'n Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Genformatic LLC as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Ass'n for M olecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc.,
1 33 S. Ct. 2 I 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Int'! Center for Technology Assessment et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 7 , Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc.,
1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Knowledge Ecology Int'I as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 1 0, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07
(20 1 3); Brief for National Women's Health Network et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 1 3, Ass'n Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07
(20 1 3); Brief for Professor Eileen M. Kane as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25,
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 1 8, Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 3 1 S. Ct. 3027 (20 1 I ); Brief for The
American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 5,
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 3 1 S. Ct. 3027 (20 1 I ).
1 35
SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24, at I .
1 36
Id. at 8.
1 37
Id. at 35.
1 38
Id. at 39. The Committee was particularly concerned about the effects on access and
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The Committee recommended that Congress provide an exemption from
patent infringement liability "for anyone who infringes a patent on a gene
while making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a genetic test for
patient care purposes. " 139 This "narrowly tailored " exemption would not
eliminate gene patents, which "would remain available and enforceable for
therapeutic uses. " 140 Three of the eighteen members of the Committee
dissented, noting that "the increasing complexity of development and clinical
testing for genetic tests and higher evidentiary standards and regulatory hurdles
such tests must meet require increasing levels of investment. " 1 4 1
Although the SACGHS Final Report does not propose limits o n patent
eligibility, the views and evidence set forth in that Report provide some
support for curtailing patent rights on diagnostic inventions. The study was
limited to the specific field of genetic testing, and is thus more directly relevant
to patents on genetic biomarkers such as those at issue in
patents on diagnostic methods of the sort at issue in

Myriad than it is to
Mayo. Nonetheless, the

report points to considerations that may have relevance in weighing the policy
consequences of excluding diagnostics from patent eligibility.
First, in its consideration of the possible incentive benefits of patents, the
report notes that patents on diagnostics are not the only way to motivate
research on the genetic basis of disease and development of related diagnostic
products.142

Biomedical research in

general, and

genomics

research in

particular, have benefited from significant government subsidies that provide
direct support for research that has facilitated the development of diagnostic
tests. 143 The report focused on past and current government subsidies as a
reason to doubt the need for patent-based exclusive rights as a further incentive
to develop genetic t�sts. But in the wake of the decisions in
policy-makers
alternative

could

also

mechanism

to

consider

increased

fortify

incentives

research
to

Mayo and Myriad,
subsidies

develop

as

an

personalized

medicine 144 without having to restore patent eligibility.

quality when patent holders licensed their rights exclusively to a single provider. Id. at 4448.
1 39 Id. at 94.
1 40 Id.
1 41 Id. The dissent is set forth at the end of the report following the appendices in
unnumbered pages.
1 42 Id. at 90; see generally Daniel J. Heme) & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REv. 303 (201 3) (providing a taxonomy of ways that the
state can promote research and development, including through research funding, tax
benefits, and prizes in addition to intellectual property).
1 43 See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellete, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent
Innovation Incentives, U.C. IRVINE L. REv. (forthcoming 20 1 5), available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Lee_Peter_IPSC_paper_20 1 4.pdf
(archived
at
http://perma.ccNPP3-6Z95) (manuscript 1 3-2 1 ) .
1 44 See Office ofthe Press Secretary Fact Sheet, supra note I (proposing $2 1 5 million i n
federal funding fo r precision medicine research).
·

2015]
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The report also notes that private investors in genetics research "appear to
rarely
focused exclusively on diagnostics,"1 45
but
instead are

simultaneously pursuing therapeutic product development. The expectation of
patents on future therapeutic products may therefore motivate research that
yields diagnostic innovations along the way, even if only the therapeutic
products are patent-eligible. Although the SACGHS Report focused on genetic
discoveries made prior to identifying therapeutic products, patent incentives to
develop therapeutics may also motivate firms to develop diagnostics in other
contexts as well. One example is companion diagnostics that are developed
and submitted for FDA approval in tandem with a drug to identify patients for
whom the drug is likely to be safe and effective. 146 So long as the drug itself is
patented, the firm may not need separate patent protection on the companion
diagnostic, especially if the diagnostic helps the firm to get FDA approval and
to market the drug. On the other hand, in some circumstances the holder of a
drug patent may worry that use of the diagnostic will diminish profits by
excluding some patients from the market for the drug. 147 In other words, if we
rely on the value of patents on therapeutic products to provide an incentive to
develop unpatentable diagnostics, incentives are likely to be skewed towards
those

diagnostics that

enhance

profits on

therapeutics

and

away from

diagnostics that threaten those profits.
Second, the report notes the importance of development costs, including
regulatory costs, in assessing the need for patents.1 48 For many of the
laboratory-developed genetic tests (i.e., tests designed, manufactured and used
within a single laboratory rather than sold for use by others) considered

by the

SACGHS, development costs had been quite low, although development costs
for FDA-regulated test kits were more substantial. 149 On the basis of a small
number of case studies, 1 50 the committee concluded that exclusive rights from
patents were not necessary for either laboratory-developed tests or test kits,
although the report acknowledges that regulatory costs might increase in the
future. 15 1 Indeed, since the release of the SACGHS Report the FDA has
announced its intention to regulate more laboratory-developed tests than it has

145 SACGH S Final Report, supra note 24, at 26.
See In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry and Food and
FDA, at 7 (Aug.
6,
2 0 1 4), available at
Drug Administration Staff,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceD
ocuments/UCM262327.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/SL7S-CYJN).
14
7
See generally Mark R. Trusheim & Ernst R. Berndt, Economic challenges and
possible policy actions to advance stratified medicine, 9 PERSONALIZED MED. 4 1 3 (20 1 2).
1 48 See SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24.
149 Id. at 34.
1 50
Id. The principal example noted in the Report is the willingness of multiple firms to
develop a test kit for cystic fibrosis without exclusive rights.
151
Id. at 35.
1 46
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done in the past, 152 making increased development costs likely in the future.
Increased FDA regulation is also likely to further enhance the role of drug
companies in selecting which diagnostics are developed and brought to market.
These considerations are complex, involving not only patent law but also
government research funding and FDA regulation. One can understand why
the courts would hesitate to address explicitly the policy implications of their
opinions

on

patent-eligibility.

Yet

those

opinions

have

reshaped

the

expectations of diagnostics innovators. Congress may be in a better position
than the courts to adjust the various levers at its disposal to rebalance the
system of resources, incentives, and costs. If it wishes to accelerate the
development of personalized medicine, it may have little choice.
CONCLUSION
Recent op1mons from the Supreme Court have profoundly reshaped the
expectations of diagnostics innovators. These opinions use the ambiguous
vocabulary of old cases excluding "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" from patenting without defining these terms, leaving some
confusion about just how far they exclude modem molecular diagnostics.
Different courts invoke different exclusions in cases that seem otherwise
indistinguishable. Yet as more cases are decided, for all the inconsistencies in
their reasoning, a consistent bottom line is emerging : diagnostic technology is
not patent-eligible.
Although they have drawn considerable criticism, these decisions follow on
the heels of policy recommendations from around the world to curtail the
effects of patents in the field of genetic diagnostics, and they have been
encouraged and celebrated by organizations of eminent doctors and scientists.
One can only hope that the celebration is justified, and that the exclusion of
diagnostics from patent-eligibility will do more to enhance future innovation
than it does to suppress it. It would be difficult for Congress to undo the
rulings in the face of so much support. Other moves are available to Congress
if it wishes to promote diagnostics innovation, including increased federal
research funding, although Congress has shown little willingness to increase
discretionary spending in recent years. Perhaps a more likely outcome is that
future diagnostics innovation will depend increasingly on pharmaceutical
industry sponsorship. If so, we might be more likely to see the development of
companion diagnostics that help to sell new patent-protected drugs than we are
to see the development of tests that identify which of us should forego costly
treatments.

1 5 2 See Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical
Laboratories: FDA Notification and Medical Device Reporting for Laboratory-Developed
Tests
(LDT's),
FDA,
at
5-6
(Oct.
3,
201 4),
available
at
http://www. fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev
gen/documents/document/ucm4 1 6684.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/9ERE-WTAS).

